Ins, outs, and the duration of trade

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Abstract. We employ survival analysis to study the duration of U.S. imports. Our findings indicate international trade is far more dynamic than previously thought. The median duration of exporting a product to the U.S. is very short, on the order of two to four years. There is negative duration dependence. If a country is able to survive in the exporting market for the first few years it will face a very small probability of failure and will likely export the product for a long period of time. The results hold across countries and industries and are robust to aggregation. JEL classification: F14, F19, C14, C41

1. Introduction

Positive trade theory usually asks questions that address the ‘who, what, when, and why’ of international trade. One question not often addressed is ‘how
long? When countries trade, how long do their trade relationships last? Are they exchanging products over long or short periods of time?

To answer these questions we study duration of trade relationships. To our knowledge we are the first to do so, and several important findings emerge from the analysis. First, not only is there a remarkable amount of entry and exit in the U.S. import market, but the period of time a country is ‘in’ the market is often fleeting. Some trade relationships are long-lived – a country exports a product for many years. It is far more common to observe short-lived trade relationships wherein a country trades a product for a few years and then stops. More than half of all trade relationships are observed for a single year and approximately 80% are observed for less than five years.

Second, because the analysis is performed at a highly disaggregated product level, one must carefully account for censored observations. Censoring is a particularly thorny issue with the benchmark product level data because of reclassification of product codes. Once we account for censoring, we can estimate survival and hazard rate functions of exporting to the United States. The median duration that a country exports a product to the United States is very short, somewhere between two and four years, depending on the censoring approach employed. Although duration does vary by source country and region, short-lived relationships characterize trade by most countries. Short relationships are prevalent for both OECD and non-OECD countries, although OECD trade relationships exhibit systematically longer survival.

Third, the results are not only robust to aggregation but in fact are strengthened by aggregation. As expected, within the SITC classification, higher levels of aggregation are associated with longer survival times. Nevertheless, there remain a large number of short spells of service until the data are very highly aggregated. Despite the higher degree of aggregation, the median survival time for SITC data is only two to three years.

Surprisingly, as we aggregate from the product level to the SITC industry level, the estimated probability of survival decreases. This paradoxical result is related to the unique censoring problems present only at the product level. As a result, it is more straightforward to conduct industry level analysis, although doing so makes it more difficult to interpret what the relationship represents. Even so, the aggregation exercise confirms that the main finding is not an anomaly.

Fourth, the results indicate the presence of negative duration dependence – the conditional probability of failure decreases with duration. The hazard rate in the first year is 33% and between year one and year five an additional 30%. Conditional on observing a trade relationship surviving the first five years, the hazard rate for the remainder of observed time is just 7–12%. A type of a threshold effect may be present: once a relationship is established and has survived the first few years, it is likely to survive a long time.

Fifth, the findings are not sensitive to changes in how we measure trade relationships or define failure. The median duration is often shorter in alternative formulations than in benchmark data. The most significant changes
occur when we give greater weight to relationships with characteristics that might be associated with duration. For instance, we consider weighting relationships using initial trade values, source country GDP, or exporters who display comparative advantage. While weighting increases duration, we nevertheless find 50% of weighted relationships are observed for less than five years.

The results indicate more is happening at the micro level than is suggested by either existing theory or empirical studies. According to the factor proportions theory, trade is based on factor endowment differences. Since such differences change gradually, trade patterns are likewise expected to evolve slowly. Unhappiness with this implication spurred the development of trade models with richer trade dynamics (Krugman 1979; Dollar 1990; Grossman and Helpman 1991). Vernon’s (1966) seminal product cycle theory is probably the best known. Vernon’s model generates a particular pattern of trade relationships. Technological leaders develop and export a product until others learn how to manufacture it and enter the market. As technology becomes more standardized, other countries will begin to produce and export the product. If follower countries have relatively low labour costs, they will eventually take over the market and push out the leaders. All models imply a fairly predictable pattern of trade dynamics – they evolve either slowly or in a logical progression from developed to developing countries.¹ From our reading of these models, all envision export durations much longer than one year and none predicts trade relationships would be as fleeting as implied by our results.

To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate the issue of duration of trade. While we introduce a new methodology (or perspective) of investigating international trade issues, the paper straddles several literatures. We can place our paper in a developing literature taking advantage of newly available, highly disaggregated trade data. Feenstra and Rose (2000) were among the first to use such data. They investigated the product cycle theory by ranking countries based on the first year of exporting a product to the United States. Their rankings are consistent with the product cycle theory. Schott (2004) investigates factor-proportions specialization and finds evidence to support it within products, but not across products. Broda and Weinstein (2004) use the same data to study growth in new varieties of traded products and estimate elasticities of substitution as well as an exact price index. Swenson (2005) uses 8-digit HS data to analyse outsourcing price decisions.

The paper also makes a contribution to the literature on dynamics of trade. Proudman and Redding (1998) and Redding (2001) investigate changes in the pattern of specialization over time, as does Schott (2004). The paper is also related in some respects to the literature on firm- and plant-level dynamics as reviewed by Tybout (2003). While the firm- and plant-level literature studies

¹ In Grossman and Helpman’s (1991) ‘quality ladder’ variant of the product cycle model the leader and follower exchange dominance of exports of a particular good over time, as leaders re-enter the market for a given good by innovating and offering a more advanced version.
dynamics at a highly disaggregated level as do we, it is primarily focused on export performance, while we are investigating primarily the importing side of trade. We discuss other significant differences in the conclusion.

Our investigation of duration of trade is stimulated in part by the findings of Haveman and Hummels (2004), Feenstra and Rose (2000), and Schott (2004), who document that in any given year and for any given product, many countries do not trade. None of the earlier studies examined whether a country’s current state (i.e., being ‘in’ or ‘out’ of the market) was a permanent feature. We show market presence is often a transitory phenomenon.

2. Data

The analysis is based on U.S. import statistics as compiled by Feenstra (1996) and augmented by Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002). From 1972 through 1988 import products were classified according to the 7-digit Tariff Schedule of the United States (TS). Since 1989 imports have been classified according to the 10-digit Harmonized System (HS). To avoid potential concordance issues, we use the second period, 1989–2001, as a natural robustness test. We study imports only because there is no concordance between the disaggregated import and export codes at the TS level. For HS data such a concordance is available, but only at the 6-digit level. In addition, export data are self-reported, making it more likely that exports are misreported.

For each product we can identify all countries from which the United States imports the product in a given year. In each period the U.S. imported a total of about 23,000 different products. On average, in each year we observe import trade for about 10,000 products sourced from about 160 countries between 1972 and 1988 and for about 15,000 products from about 180 countries between 1989 and 2001. We will refer to the results based on TS and HS data as the benchmark results. Later we perform a series of robustness checks including aggregating from the product level to the industry level data where we use the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) industry codes to define trade relationships.

2.1. Trade relationships and spells of service

Our interest is to study the length of time until a country ceases to export a product to the U.S., an event we will refer to as a ‘failure.’ Calendar time is not
as important as analysis time, which measures the length of time a country exports a product to the United States. For each product and country we use the annual data to create spell data. If the United States imports product \(i\) from country \(c\) from 1976 to 1980, the \(ci^{th}\) trade relationship has a spell length of five.

The benchmark analysis is based on the most disaggregated data available; the analysis is at the product level, not the industry level. Inferences are based on trade in tangible products rather than aggregate summaries. Until recently, such disaggregated data were not widely available and empirical studies were based on industry classifications.

As an example of the level of detail, TS data report information on more than 30 different types of ball bearings, differentiating by specialized application (e.g., automobiles), size, and chemistry. At the SITC level, all ball bearing codes are aggregated along with other similar, or perhaps not so similar, products to create spells of service. The dozens of ball bearing codes map into a single SITC category, ‘Ball, roller or needle roller bearings’ (4 digit code = 7491). Further aggregation is possible, to “Non-electric machinery parts” (3 digit code = 749) or ‘Industrial machinery’ (2 digit code = 74), but doing so makes it increasingly difficult to interpret the results, since each classification includes highly disparate products.

Using highly disaggregated data for duration analysis is imperative. First, the more aggregated the data, the more the analysis identifies industry trends rather than competitive dynamics at the product level. That country \(c\) in industry \(j\) has a long duration tells us little about duration of commodity trade or underlying trade dynamics.

Suppose we observe three countries exporting ‘Industrial machinery,’ with each having long duration. One might surmise dynamics among the countries to be very similar. It need not be the case. Country \(c_1\) might be uniformly superior: every product it sells could have a long duration. Country \(c_2\) might be a dismal failure: the success (i.e., long duration) of one product could hide a multitude of failures (short-lived spells). Country \(c_3\) could be a classic example of Vernon’s product cycle: the observed long duration at the industry level could reflect a progression from simpler products (ball bearings) to very complicated products (engines). The more aggregated the data the more cautious one should be interpreting the results; a less munificent view might be that aggregated data make it impossible to measure dynamics.

Second, if the products are too broadly defined, we cannot expect to see any source countries exit the market. If we aggregate all imports from each country, we will observe little exit, since the United States purchases some products from nearly every source country every year. Higher aggregation may hide a great deal of dynamics and competition in the import market.

For each product we create a panel of countries which export the product to the U.S. Table 1 provides an example of TS data for a representative product, ‘Milled Corn (TS = 1312000).’ The ‘X’s in the table indicate years in which
each country exports the product to the United States. There are countries that export corn every year, such as Canada and Portugal. Exporting a product in every observed year creates a 17-year-long spell. Another dozen countries have a single spell. Mexico begins exporting corn in 1974, South Korea in 1976, and Peru in 1984, and all three service the U.S. market in every year after entry. All the remaining countries with a single spell export corn for just one year.

There are a number of countries with two spells. The United States imports corn from Venezuela in every year but 1981. Ecuador exports corn in 1973 and 1974 (first spell, length 2) and then services the U.S. market for the second time

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TABLE 2
Summary statistics

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<th>Observed Spell length (years)</th>
<th>Estimated KM survival rate</th>
<th>Total number of spells</th>
<th>Total number of product codes</th>
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starting in 1979 and continuing through 1988 (second spell, length 10). The Dominican Republic also has two spells, but both are of length 1. Colombia and Italy have three spells apiece, both starting with two short ones (of lengths 3 and 1; and 1 and 2), before entering the U.S. market for the third time (1981
and 1980) and exporting for the remainder of observed time. Of the remaining countries, most have very short spells, with the exception of the Netherlands, whose first spell is five years long. All its remaining four spells, however, are one year long.

As shown in table 2 there are 693,963 (918,236) observed spells of service at the TS (HS) level. Both TS and HS datasets have a median spell length of 1 year and a mean spell length of about 3 years. We will discuss how aggregation affects the results in more detail in section 5, but we note here that table 2 also includes summary statistics for trade relationships created from the more aggregated SITC industry level data. In the top panel of the table we see that in the 1972–88 period there are 157,441 observations at the 5-digit SITC level, 43,480 observations at the 3-digit level, and just 2,445 observations at the 1-digit level. As expected, aggregating the data diminishes the ability to observe entry and exit – for the 1972–88 period the mean spell length increases from 2.7 years in the 7-digit TS data to 3.9 years in the 5-digit SITC data to 8.4 years in the 1-digit SITC data.

In figure 1 we plot the distribution for each observed spell length for each sub-period. The x-axis plots the observed spell length. The y-axis plots the percentage of observations whose observed spell of service is greater than a given length. The graphs depict very similar trends. In both the 7-digit TS and 10-digit HS data more than half of all spells are just one year long; about 70% of spells are observed for two or fewer years; about 75% of spells are observed for three or fewer years. In both periods we see that only a small fraction of spells are observed in the full length of the panel. The main point is clear: there is a plethora of short spells. In figure 1 we plot the distribution for alternative measures of trade relationships as well; these other distributions will be discussed later in the paper.

2.2. Multiple spells

As illustrated in table 1, some trade relationships reoccur, exhibiting what we will refer to as multiple spells of service. A country will service the market, exit, then re-enter the market, and then almost always exit again. Approximately 30% of relationships experience multiple spells of service in the disaggregated product level data. About two-thirds of relationships with multiple spells experience just two spells; less than 10% have more than three spells.

We begin by treating multiple spells as independent. While the assumption is made primarily in the interest of simplicity, in section 5 we explore alternatives and find the results are likely not overly sensitive to it. To get a sense of

6 To give an example of how we aggregated from TS to SITC, TS code 1312000 (Milled Corn) maps into the 5-digit SITC code 04702 (Meal or Groats non-wheat). We aggregated all of the TS codes that map into SITC 04702 and then created spells. We repeated this process for each SITC code.

7 Qualitatively similar trends are seen for the 1989–2001 period (the middle panel of the table) although the mean and median spell lengths do increase slightly.
why, it is instructive to look at the distribution of spells excluding multiple spells. First, let us restrict the analysis to trade relationships with just one spell. While the message is the same whether we look at HS or TS data, for expositional clarity let us look at TS data. As reported in table 2, restricting ourselves to the ‘one spell only’ relationships results in a median (mean) spell length of 1 (3.2) year. The median is exactly the same as in benchmark data and the mean is just a half a year longer. In the upper graph in figure 1 we show the entire distribution for both benchmark and ‘one spell only’ data. More than half of all spells are just one year long and about 75% of spells are observed for less than four years; further, in both distributions only about 5% of spells are observed for 10 or more years. In other words, the overall distribution of spell lengths does not appear to be distorted by multiple spell observations.

Alternatively, we can restrict the analysis to the first spell only: relationships with just one spell and the first spell of multiple spell relationships. We report statistics for the first spell only data in table 2.8 The similarity among the distributions suggests the independence assumption is a reasonable starting place.

2.3. Censoring
Once we begin to think of data in terms of spells, it becomes apparent we need to account for censoring in the analysis. It is often unknown whether a trade relationship ends because of a failure or for some other reason. Consequently, there is uncertainty regarding either the beginning or the ending date (or both) for some trade relationships.

Censoring is common in U.S. import data. In both periods about half of all spells are censored and about 20% of spells are censored at one year. The censoring problem comes in two flavours. First, there is no information on trade relationships for the years before the beginning and after the end of the sample. From table 1 we observe that the United States imported corn from the Philippines in 1972 and the relationship was observed for exactly one year. It may have begun in 1972 or it may have begun in some prior year. The most appropriate interpretation is it had a duration of at least one year. Similarly, we observe the United States importing corn from Peru from 1984 to 1988. Data do not continue beyond 1988 (recorded using the TS classification), and it is impossible to ascertain how long the spell ultimately lasted. Once again, the most appropriate interpretation is a duration of at least five years. For TS data about 10% of spells are observed in 1972, while about 22% are observed in 1988. For HS data about 20% of spells are observed in 1989 and about 28% are observed in 2001.9 The first type of censoring is typical in survival studies and is accounted for in the subsequent analysis.

8 In order to keep figure 1 readable we do not depict the first spell distribution; we simply note that it is very similar to the benchmark.

9 For TS data, less than 2% of all spells are observed continuously in every year, while less than 6% of spells for HS data are observed in every year.
The second type of censoring is unique to the product level data. The U.S. Customs revises product definitions for the tariff codes on an ongoing basis, sometimes splitting a single code into multiple codes and at other times combining multiple codes into fewer codes. Unfortunately, there is no information to allow us to map old product codes into new ones. When a code is changed, there is no longer any observed trade in the old code, but is this due to the end of a relationship or does it simply mean trade stopped, owing to reclassification? Throughout much of the analysis we choose to be cautious and classify all such ‘exits’ as censored. Reclassified relationships are interpreted as having a duration of at least \( x \) years (where \( x \) is the number of years when trade in the original code was observed).

An analogous problem exists for new codes. When a code is changed, we begin to observe trade in the new code, but is this really the beginning of a new relationship or does it simply reflect the reclassification? Once again, we choose to be cautious and assume the relationship had a duration of at least \( y \) years (where \( y \) is the number of years when trade in the new code was observed). About 20 (10)\% of the spells are censored in TS (HS) data, owing to reclassification. The second type of censoring is a peculiar characteristic of our particular application, and we incorporate it into benchmark estimates.

The interpretation of all product code changes as being censored is very conservative – certainly some of the new codes were truly measuring new products and some of the obsolete codes were measuring products that were no longer traded. In the benchmark TS and HS data some spells are probably classified as being censored when they were truly associated with either entry or exit. If more information were available, it would be possible to identify such births and deaths.\(^{10}\) Unfortunately, this additional information does not exist. Consequently, benchmark results will overstate the true duration of a typical trading relationship.

3. Modelling duration

3.1. Duration models
Let \( T \) denote time to a failure event. Since time in the analysis is discrete, we assume \( T \) is a discrete random variable taking on values \( t_i, i = 1, 2, \ldots, n \), with a probability density function \( p(t_i) = \Pr(T = t_i), \ i = 1, 2, \ldots, n \), where \( t_1 < t_2 < \ldots < t_n \). The survival function for a random variable \( T \) is given by

\[
S(t) = \Pr(T > t) = \sum_{t_i > t} p(t_i).
\]

\(^{10}\) Xiang (2005) uses the changes in the verbal description of 4-digit SIC industry codes to identify new products. Even using relatively aggregated industry data (about 450 industries) Xiang describes a time-consuming and painstaking process.
The hazard function is

\[ h(t_i) = \Pr(T = t_i \mid T \geq t_i) = \frac{p(t_i)}{S(t_{i-1})}, \quad i = 1, 2, \ldots, n, \]

where \( S(t_0) = 1 \). The survival and hazard functions are related through the following expression:

\[ S(t) = \prod_{t_i < t} [1 - h(t_i)]. \]

### 3.2. Non-parametric estimation

To estimate the survival and hazard functions we will assume we have \( n \) independent observations denoted \( (t_i, c_i), i = 1, 2, \ldots, n \), where \( t_i \) is the survival time and \( c_i \) is the censoring indicator variable \( C \) of observation \( i \). If failure occurred \( c_i \) takes on a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. Assume there are \( m \leq n \) recorded times of failure. Denote the rank-ordered survival times as \( t(1) < t(2) < \ldots < t(m) \). Let \( n_i \) denote the number of subjects at risk of failing at \( t(i) \), and let \( d_i \) denote the number of observed failures. The Kaplan-Meier product limit estimator of the survivor function is then

\[ \hat{S}(t) = \prod_{t(i) \leq t} \frac{n_i - d_i}{n_i}, \]

with the convention that \( \hat{S}(t) = 1 \) if \( t < t(1) \). The Kaplan-Meier estimator is robust to censoring and uses information from both censored and non-censored observations.

The hazard function is estimated by taking the ratio of subjects who fail to the number of subjects at risk in a given period \( i \),

\[ \hat{h}(t) = \frac{d_i}{n_i}. \]

We choose to estimate the hazard function at the observed failure times only.

### 4. Empirical results

#### 4.1. 7-digit TS data

4.1.1. Benchmark and modified censoring survival functions

We begin by examining the benchmark 7-digit TS data and report our findings in tables 2 and 3. Table 2 reports the 1-, 4-, and 12-year survival rates for benchmark data and also for a series of alternative formulations designed to investigate the robustness of the results. Table 3 reports survival rates for benchmark data and also for sub-samples (i.e., by region and industry). The analysis conveys several important lessons about duration of trade.
First and foremost, a very large fraction of relationships fail after only a year or two. For the benchmark TS data, only 67% of relationships survive one year; 49% survive four years; 42% survive 12 years (table 2). An almost identical survival experience is found in HS data. In fact, as we will discuss below, a qualitatively similar experience is seen across all estimates.\textsuperscript{11} The message is quite clear: the typical U.S. trade relationship is very short lived.

The estimated overall survival function, $\hat{S}(t)$, is graphed in the upper-left-hand corner of figure 2 together with the 95% confidence interval. The confidence interval is very tight (imperceptible), which is not surprising, given the size of the data set.\textsuperscript{12} The survival function is downward sloping with a decreasing slope. It suggests a declining hazard rate function, as confirmed in the lower left hand corner of figure 2.

The second important finding is the sharp decline of the risk of failure. It is quite high in the early years, but then rapidly falls once a trade relationship survives a threshold duration. As shown, a large number of relationships fail during the first four years, especially in the first year when the hazard rate is

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Estimated Kaplan-Meier survival rate}
\begin{tabular}{lccc}
\hline
 & TS7-benchmark & & TS7-mod. censoring \\
 & 1 year & 4 year & 12 year & 1 year & 4 year & 12 year \\
\hline
\textbf{Total regions} & & & & & & \\
0.67 & 0.49 & 0.42 & 0.55 & 0.28 & 0.19 \\
North America & 0.78 & 0.64 & 0.57 & 0.68 & 0.43 & 0.33 \\
Asia & 0.71 & 0.55 & 0.48 & 0.58 & 0.30 & 0.20 \\
Western Europe & 0.71 & 0.53 & 0.46 & 0.59 & 0.32 & 0.23 \\
South America & 0.62 & 0.41 & 0.32 & 0.49 & 0.22 & 0.13 \\
Eastern Europe & 0.58 & 0.36 & 0.27 & 0.45 & 0.18 & 0.09 \\
Oceania & 0.60 & 0.37 & 0.28 & 0.49 & 0.22 & 0.13 \\
Africa & 0.52 & 0.29 & 0.19 & 0.39 & 0.15 & 0.08 \\
Middle East & 0.57 & 0.36 & 0.29 & 0.44 & 0.19 & 0.12 \\
\hline
\textbf{SITC (rev 2) 1-digit industries} & & & & & \\
0-Food & 0.58 & 0.36 & 0.29 & 0.52 & 0.28 & 0.20 \\
1-Beverages/Tobacco & 0.65 & 0.47 & 0.41 & 0.54 & 0.28 & 0.20 \\
2-Crude Materials & 0.54 & 0.31 & 0.24 & 0.50 & 0.25 & 0.17 \\
3-Mineral Fuels & 0.58 & 0.38 & 0.28 & 0.53 & 0.27 & 0.19 \\
4-Animal and Vegetable Oils & 0.51 & 0.29 & 0.21 & 0.48 & 0.24 & 0.15 \\
5-Chemicals & 0.62 & 0.41 & 0.35 & 0.56 & 0.30 & 0.22 \\
6-Manufactured Materials & 0.63 & 0.44 & 0.37 & 0.54 & 0.29 & 0.20 \\
7-Machinery & 0.72 & 0.56 & 0.52 & 0.58 & 0.33 & 0.21 \\
8-Miscellaneous Manufactures & 0.73 & 0.58 & 0.50 & 0.55 & 0.26 & 0.17 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{11} The alternatives will be discussed in section 5.
\textsuperscript{12} Given the narrowness of the estimated confidence intervals we do not plot them in other figures.
FIGURE 2  Overall survival and hazard functions
33% for TS data. However, after about four or five years failure becomes a lot less common. The hazard rate between year one and year five is an additional 30%. The hazard rate for the remaining twelve years is just 12%.\textsuperscript{13} Countries exporting to the United States face a large conditional probability of failure in the early stage of their trade relationship and a much smaller one after surviving a few years.

Both the survival and the hazard functions indicate negative duration dependence – the conditional probability of failure decreases as duration increases. There is a type of a threshold effect. Once a relationship is established and has survived the first few years, it is likely to survive a long time. The finding is similar to that documented by Pakes and Ericson (1998) for retail trade establishments.\textsuperscript{14}

It is somewhat surprising that the Kaplan-Meier estimated probability of exporting a product for more than 17 years is so high (0.41), given that less than 2% of all trade relationships span the entire sample (figure 1). The explanation for the seemingly inconsistent finding is the prevalence of censoring at the product level. Many relationships observed to end are censored and are not classified as failures in benchmark results.

The impact of censoring due to product code changes can be identified if we estimate the Kaplan-Meier survival function using the modified censoring approach already discussed. Under the alternative scheme all changes and reclassifications in TS codes are interpreted as births and deaths which leads to much more entry and exit. We report the results in table 2 and plot the survival curve in figure 3.\textsuperscript{15} Under the alternative approach duration is even shorter than in the benchmark case: the median duration falls to just two years as compared with four years, while the 75\textsuperscript{th} percentile is just six years.

As depicted in figure 3, the probability of survival is substantially lower during the initial years under modified censoring; by year four it is about 20 percentage points smaller. As was the case with benchmark data, the hazard rate falls sharply and there is little additional failure after four or five years. The probability of exporting a product for more than 17 years under modified censoring is only 0.18 – less than half the benchmark – but still considerably higher than the observed 2% of trade relationships that span the entire sample.

4.1.2. Region and industry survival rates
In table 3 we report survival rates broken out by individual regions and industries for both benchmark and modified censoring data. For all regions a substantial fraction of trade relationships quickly end in failure: 20–50% of relationships fail in the first year. In each region a substantial number of additional relationships fail in the next several years. By the end of year four, no more than two-thirds and as few as 29% of relationships have survived. While there are clear differences

\textsuperscript{13} In TS data more than 50% of observed spells of service fail within the first four years, but over the next 13 years about 7% of spells fail.

\textsuperscript{14} Pakes and Ericson interpret their results as supporting Jovanovic’s (1982) theory of learning.

\textsuperscript{15} In the modified scheme products traded in 1972 or 1988 are still classified as censored.
across regions in the severity of the initial wave of failures, the pattern of negative duration dependence is seen for each region.\footnote{The survival rates across regions and industries are all statistically different from one another. Given the large sample size, this result is not surprising.}

The analysis at the individual region level suggests that duration of trade can broadly be thought of as a north versus south story, with northern sources having...
higher survival rates. With benchmark data northern regions (as represented by North America, Asia, and Western Europe) have a median duration of at least six years; for each northern region almost half of spells survive at least twelve years.

Quite a different story emerges for southern regions. They have a median duration of no more than two years – half of all trade relationships will fail within the first two years. By year 12, no more than one-third of spells survive. The difference between northern and southern regions is also observed under the modified censoring scheme, where once again northern regions have uniformly higher median survival times.\textsuperscript{17}

To confirm the north-south differences, we divided the countries into two groups, OECD and non-OECD, and estimated the survival function for each group. On average, the estimated survival for OECD countries is about 10 percentage points higher than for non-OECD countries. While the survival pattern is qualitatively similar across regions, northern countries clearly fare better.\textsuperscript{18}

When we look at survival functions across industries, broadly similar trends appear again: a wave of initial failures followed by a significant decrease in the hazard. At least 25% of spells fail in year one for every industry. In benchmark data, with the exception of two industries, the median survival time is three years or less.

In two key industries, Machinery (SITC 7) and Miscellaneous Manufactures (SITC 8), the estimated median duration is far longer, more than 11 years. An explanation for the distinct difference between these two industries and the others lies in the high prevalence of product reclassification in them. As shown in table 3, under the modified censoring scheme the two industries have a survival experience very similar to other industries.

The higher than average incidence of product code changes might reflect more innovation and shorter product cycles; a dynamism that results in numerous TS code changes. If so, then the modified censoring scheme does a better job of capturing the actual dynamics, since the code changes probably reflect true entry and exit (i.e., births and deaths). On the other hand, it might reflect other factors that are not associated with economically meaningful entry and exit. Code changes might simply be a way to mitigate the impact of GATT negotiated tariff reductions or expand the scope of the Multifibre Agreement. In this case, the benchmark censoring scheme is more appropriate and the two industries are outliers. A resolution of the issue is beyond the scope of this paper but certainly merits further analysis.

4.2. 10-digit HS data

Are dynamics uncovered using TS data unique to the earlier 1972–88 period? Even if the earlier period is characterized by short-lived trade relationships, the

\textsuperscript{17} Using benchmark data, we estimated survival functions for individual regions. In the interest of conserving space, and since the shapes of survival functions are similar to that of the survival function for all data, we chose not to present the graphs. Table 3 is sufficient to illustrate differences across regions and industries.

\textsuperscript{18} Owing to space limitations, we do not present the estimates. They are available upon request.
more recent period may not be. Has the world changed in any way since the 1972–88 period?

We use the 10-digit HS level data to investigate these questions. Reassuringly, none of the results changes substantially in the more recent period. Given they are qualitatively the same, we refrain from a lengthy discussion of the 1989–2001 results and provide only a short summary. First, the main result – duration of trade is fleeting – still holds. The median duration at the 10-digit HS level is only four years, as was the case for the 7-digit TS data.

Second, as depicted in figure 2, the survival and hazard functions for HS data demonstrate negative duration dependence. The probability of failing in the first year is 34%. The hazard rate between year one and year five is an additional 30%. The hazard rate for the remaining eight years is just 7%.

Third, censoring due to product code changes again significantly affects the estimated survival. As was the case with TS data, once we implement the modified censoring approach the median duration is just two years. Fourth, the estimated survival functions across regions and industries, particularly in terms of which regions or industries perform better, are very similar to those found using TS data.\(^\text{19}\)

5. Robustness of results

At the product level trade relationships are quite short: the estimated median survival is between two and four years. We now examine whether the findings are robust to how we measure trade relationships and spells.

5.1. Aggregation concerns – SITC level analysis

We begin by exploring whether the findings are possibly due to the highly disaggregated nature of the data. Thirty different ball-bearing codes may represent an overly fine parsing of the data leading to the observation of excessive entry and exit. If so, a trade relationship might be better measured using SITC industry classifications.

We calculated spells of service using SITC industry (revision 2) definitions ranging from the 5-digit to the 1-digit level. From table 2 we see that for both periods investigated the total number of products (or industries) declines from almost 23,000 at the product level to about 1,700 at the 5-digit industry level to 10 at the 1-digit industry level. For TS data the number of observed spells of service declines from almost 700,000 to about 157,000 at the 5-digit level to some 2,500 at the 1-digit level. For HS data the number of observed spells of trade declines from more than 900,000 to about 156,000 at the 5-digit level to about 2,200 at the 1-digit level.

\(^{19}\) Results are available upon request.
The extent of aggregation is extraordinary. There are 93% fewer product categories at the 5-digit SITC level than at either the TS or HS level. Thinking in terms of trade relationships (a country-product pair), on average when there is an aggregation in a trading relationship, some 12–14 spells are aggregated. With such extensive aggregation, we expected to observe a significant increase in the estimated probability of survival. Interestingly, the results indicate otherwise.

Results for the SITC classifications are given in table 2 – the median observed spell length is two or fewer years in the 5- through 2-digit SITC data for both 1972–88 and 1989–2001 periods. In other words, in spite of the significant amount of aggregation when moving from products to industries, the typical relationship continues to be very short lived. The Kaplan-Meier estimates are depicted in figure 3. The industry level analysis not only confirms our product level findings but also provides an important new insight into the complicated censoring issue.

First, within the SITC classification, aggregation works exactly as expected. For instance, as shown in table 2 and figure 3, higher levels of aggregation are associated with higher survival rates. The survival function for the progressively more aggregated SITC data lies above the less aggregated SITC data. Although aggregation creates longer spells, the estimated survival probabilities remain remarkably low. Only about one-third of the 5-digit SITC observations survive four years. There remains a large number of short spells of service until the data are very highly aggregated. The median survival time is two years for the 5-digit, 4-digit, and 3-digit SITC data for the 1972–88 period. Aggregation has a more appreciable impact for the 1989–2001 period but the median survival time remains short.

Second, in comparison with the median survival times for either comparable 7-digit TS or 10-digit HS data, the brevity of duration times for SITC data is surprising. For TS data, for instance, despite the higher degree of aggregation, all the 5- through 2-digit SITC data have a shorter median survival time than the comparable product-level data. Only the 1-digit SITC data have a higher survival function than the comparable product-level data. For HS data, the 5- and 4-digit SITC data have a shorter median duration than the comparable product-level data.

In other words, aggregation from products to industries lowers survival. Taken at face value, this is an odd result. There is a logical explanation. The SITC classification system (revision 2) is unchanged throughout the sample. As a result, only the first type of censoring (which is driven by the beginning and end of the sample) occurs. This type of censoring is known to bias the estimated survival probabilities downward.

20 Not all country-product pairs are aggregated when we move to industry-level analysis. For instance, some countries supply only one product within a SITC industry. In these cases the country-product pair uniquely maps into country-industry pair.

21 In order to keep the figure readable, we do not depict the 4-digit and 2-digit SITC Kaplan-Meier estimates, but note simply that the 4-digit SITC curve lies above the 5-digit SITC curve, the 3-digit curve lies above the 4-digit SITC curve, and so on. The figure with all industries plotted is available upon request.
end of the sample) is present in the SITC analysis. It may be more appropriate, therefore, to compare results based on the SITC classification with modified censoring data. As shown in figure 3, when we make that comparison, we get the expected result: survival experience for product level data is lower than for the 5-digit industry level data and aggregation increases estimated survival time.

SITC data make it clear that both approaches towards handling censoring in product-level data are imperfect. In an ideal world we would be able to truly identify all births, deaths, and censored product changes. Since we cannot do so, we are left with two imperfect measures: (i) the benchmark product-level data, which overstate the true survival experience (since all product code changes are censored) and (ii) modified censoring data, which understate the true survival experience (since all product code changes are interpreted as births and deaths).

Given that survival at the product level must be shorter than at the industry level, the estimates in figure 3 indicate that the true product-level survival lies between the two measures. The SITC results imply that the true median survival experience at the product level is two to four years and is probably closer to two years. In fact, if aggregation leads to longer survival, then the true product-level survival lies between that for the modified censoring approach with product-level data and the 5-digit SITC-level data. In either case, the evidence is clear: duration is very brief.

In addition, we note that, by using industry-level data to define relationships, we can create a time horizon significantly longer than is possible at the product level. Using the industry-level data, we can examine survival over the whole 1972–2001 period, without splitting it in two. In the lower panel of figure 5 we depict the Kaplan-Meier estimated survival function for the whole 1972–2001 period using the 5-digit SITC-level data. At the bottom of table 2 we report the 1-, 4-, and 12-year survival rates for this longer SITC horizon. The results are quite similar to those based on the sub-periods: a significant number of very short duration relationships and little hazard after 4–5 years. Given the negative duration dependence found in all of our runs, we believe that the longer horizon confirms all of the main lessons found in the sub-samples. We note, however, that the longer horizon produces slightly lower survival rates, since there is no censoring, owing to the splitting of the data in 1988.22

The results presented in this section cannot be overstated. It is very surprising that trade as measured at the 5- through 2-digit SITC level is so brief. After all, the extent of aggregation from the disaggregated product-level data to the

22 We point out that we have more industry codes with the longer horizon data than are found using the industry data derived from either the TS or HS data. This is apparently a result of imperfect concordance mapping for the disaggregated trade. Since the longer horizon data is created using reported SITC industry data we cannot determine where or why the product level trade data does not perfectly concord to the industry data.
5-digit SITC level is extraordinary. There are about 13 times as many product
codes at the product level and 4-6 times as many spells of service than at the
5-digit level. Yet the estimated survival rates for the 5- through 3-digit SITC-
level data are not very different than the benchmark product-level data. Except
for the highly aggregated SITC-level data there is a multitude of short spells of
service however the data are examined, whether looking at all spells or looking
across regions and industries. Regardless of how aggregated the data are, trade
is surprisingly fleeting.

5.2. Multiple spells
About 30% of trade relationships experience multiple spells of service. In the
above analysis we have assumed duration is independent of the spell number.
We now investigate whether this assumption biases the findings.

We considered several alternative approaches towards the issue of multiple
spells. First, we simply limit the analysis to relationships with a single spell
only. In figure 1 we plotted the distribution for trade relationships with a single
spell. As noted earlier, there is very little difference between distributions for
single-spell and benchmark data, especially for TS data. The Kaplan-Meier
estimated survival function for single-spell data is depicted in figure 4 (left-side
charts). The survival function for single-spell data has a similar pattern as
benchmark data: high hazard in the first few years followed by a leveling-off
of the survival function. In spite of the similar pattern, single-spell data do
exhibit significantly higher survival; for TS data the survival for single-spell
relationships is about 11 percentage points higher than for benchmark data in
year 12.

The similarity of spell length distributions (figure 1) sharply contrasts with
the differences in Kaplan-Meier estimates. The censoring approach taken in
benchmark data plays a role. A greater fraction of observations are censored in
single-spell data, which shifts the Kaplan-Meier estimates up. In single-spell
data 74% survive one year, compared with 67% in benchmark data. Given
that the SITC results indicate that benchmark data overstate the amount of
censoring and that the modified censoring approach may yield a more appro-
priate measure of the true survival experience, we re-estimate single-spell data
using the modified censoring approach and present the Kaplan-Meier
estimates in figure 4 (right-side charts). With modified censoring, the median
survival time is now 3 years, compared with 2 years, when all observations are
included. While single-spell data have a higher survival experience, the effect is
not as great as in the benchmark censoring approach: about 8 percentage
points higher than the benchmark in year 12 for TS data.

The second approach we explored was to limit the analysis to first spells –
relationships with just one spell and the first spell of relationships with multiple
spells. The results are generally similar to the single-spell results and are
available upon request.
FIGURE 4 Alternative treatments, product-level data
5.3. Measurement error

Another way we addressed the issue of multiple spells was to consider the possibility that some of the reported multiple spells are due to a measurement error. Specifically, if the time between spells is short, it may be that the gap is mis-measured and interpreting the initial spell as ‘failing’ is inappropriate. It may be more appropriate to interpret the two spells as one longer spell. To allow for such misreporting, we assume that a one-year gap between spells is an error, merge individual spells, and adjust spell length accordingly. Gaps of two or more years are assumed to be accurate and no change is made.

The spell length distribution for gap-adjusted data is depicted in figure 1. The adjustment shifts the distribution but short spells remain the norm. In table 2 we report the summary statistics for the gap-adjusted data. In comparison with benchmark data, the average spell length is less than a year longer. The 1-, 4-, and 12-year survival rates in gap-adjusted data are about 7–9 percentage points higher than in benchmark data.

The Kaplan-Meier estimated survival function for gap-adjusted data is depicted in figure 4 (left-side charts). As expected, the survival function exhibits less early failure and more failure in later times. The hazard rate for the last 12 years is just 12% in benchmark data but 14% in gap-adjusted data. As was the case with single-spell and first-spell alternatives, using the modified censoring approach reduces the difference between gap-adjusted and benchmark data (right-side charts).

The results suggest that the independence assumption likely leads to underestimated duration, although the magnitude of the bias is fairly small for most scenarios. If one believes the modified censoring approach best captures the true survival experience, the independence assumption does not have a significant impact under any scenario.

5.4. Weighted analysis

The next issue we explore involves putting more weight on the higher-valued trade relationships. Benchmark analysis – in fact, all of the preceding analysis – is unweighted. Small and large trade value relationships receive equal weight. If short spells involve small values and long spells involve large values, an unweighted distribution might overstate the brevity of spells.

In order to get a sense for how much our results might be affected if large values are given greater emphasis, we considered three possible weighting schemes. First, we computed a weighted distribution where each observation is weighted by the square-root of the value of trade in the first year of the relationship. This alternative formulation de-emphasizes low-value spells and gives more importance to high-value spells; we took the square root because the distribution of first-year trade values is extremely skewed, and we do not believe the effect on duration is proportional to size.
Second, we weighted each observation by the GDP of the supplying country in the year the spell starts.\(^{23}\) Given the earlier results, we know that richer northern countries have better survival than poorer southern countries. Because duration is arguably endogeneous with respect to first-year trade value, GDP may be a superior weighting scheme. On the other hand, GDP is a coarser weight, since all relationships from country \(c\) starting in year \(t\) have the same weight. Moreover, GDP does not capture any comparative advantage differences across industries.

Third, we weighted each observation by each source country’s industry worldwide export share in the first year of the spell. Owing to data limitations, we were able to compute export shares only at the 4-digit SITC data level; we then mapped these industry export shares to the product-level data.\(^{24}\) The third weighting scheme is also attractive, because duration endogeneity is unlikely. Moreover, export shares offer a substantially finer weighting scheme than GDP and will likely reflect comparative advantage (to the extent comparative advantage varies by industry and not by product).

In figure 1 we plot the spell length distribution under the trade weighted alternative. There is a significant shift in the distribution, far greater than any other robustness check. The other two weights also shift the distribution out, but not as much as the trade weights. GDP and export share weights shift the distribution of spell lengths for TS data to a position slightly higher than that of single-spell relationships distribution in figure 1, with GDP having a slightly larger impact. The only difference for HS data is that export share weights have a larger impact than GDP weights. In the benchmark TS and HS data more than half the spells are observed for just a single year. In the trade weighted analysis about 25% of spells are observed for a single year for both TS and HS data. With GDP and export share weights, some 40% of spells are observed for a single year in both data sets.

Trade relationships involving either small initial value, small economies, and small exporters tend to be short lived. Even under the weighted schemes there remains a surfeit of short spells. About 65% of trade weighted spells and more than 75% of GDP and export share weighted spells are observed for four or fewer years in TS data, while for HS data the corresponding figures are 50% and 60%. For comparison, in the benchmark approach more than 80% of spells are observed for four or fewer years in both data sets.

In figure 5 we present the Kaplan-Meier estimated survival functions for the three alternative schemes for weighted TS data. We also present the weighted results for the long-horizon SITC industry data.\(^{25}\) In table 2 we report the 1-, 4-, and 12-year survival rates for the alternative weighting schemes. Under all

\(^{23}\) GDP is reported in *World Development Indicators* (World Bank Statistics).

\(^{24}\) To calculate industry export shares we used the NBER UN Trade Data compiled by Feenstra et al. (2005). The database provides annual imports and exports between 1962 and 2000 as reported by the UN Comtrade database at the 4-digit SITC level for most of the countries in the world. Weights for 2001 were set equal to those in 2000.

\(^{25}\) HS results are available upon request. They are similar to those for TS data.
schemes the impact on survival is significant. As seen, the trade weighted scheme has the greatest impact on survival. For perspective, trade weighting has a greater impact on duration than aggregating to the 1-digit industry level or the restriction to single-spell relationships. The other two weighting schemes are similar to aggregating to the 2- to 3- digit industry level.
The weighted analysis indicates that size has something to do with duration: the bigger the source country is – whether size is defined by the value of its trade, the size of its economy, or its share of world exports – the longer its trade relationships are with the U.S. However, as shown, size is not the whole story. Even after taking into account size, a great majority of spells are still very short – far shorter than commonly thought prior to this study.

6. Interpretation and suggestions for future work

Our goal in this paper was to investigate the nature of duration of trade and to introduce a novel way of examining trade. In the process of doing so we have shown that trade duration is exceptionally short. The question of why trade relationships are so short is beyond the scope of this paper and is a matter of our ongoing research agenda. It does seem to us, however, that answers go beyond standard trade theory, which seems ill equipped to analyse duration of trade.

The Heckscher-Ohlin factor endowments model would suggest that trade is very persistent. While factor endowments can and do change over time, it is difficult to believe they change as rapidly as suggested by the results. Even more, the great extent of multiple spells of service would suggest that changes in factor endowments go back and forth. Factor endowment models would suggest there may be a range of products over which countries flip back and forth between exporting and importing, but it would be a very limited range of products. About 30% of trade relationships experience multiple spells of service. One is hard pressed to explain such dynamic behaviour with Heckscher-Ohlin models. Nor is it clear the gravity equation can explain the results. It would suggest that, once countries start trading, the relationships would be very persistent and there would be little turnover.

While the Ricardian comparative advantage model may seem equally inadequate to explain the observed volatility of trade, it is possible to construct a model based on comparative advantage that exhibits volatility of trade. Think of a comparative advantage model with neoclassical production technologies with goods being homogeneous within product lines, stochastic shocks to production technology, and trade costs that vary bilaterally across partners. If a country has a deep comparative advantage in a product, it may export it to many trade partners, though not necessarily all, because of the presence of trade costs. With standard convex production technologies, the international trade equilibrium may exhibit incomplete product specialization. In this setting several producers may serve a single export market at the same cost, inclusive of freight price, making the importer indifferent among them. Small stochastic shocks to production technology may induce exporters to add or drop marginal trade partners, depending on whether it is profitable to

26 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this explanation.
service them. This would introduce a possibility for a large amount of entry and exit in international trade relationships when the exporter has a narrow comparative advantage in shipping a product to a particular destination. For example, Canada and Portugal may have a deep comparative advantage in shipping corn, allowing them to continuously service the U.S. market. Germany and Brazil may be the marginal suppliers, causing them to service the United States over extremely short periods of time, depending on the realization of a shock to the production technology. This model is similar to those developed by Bernard et al. (2003) and Deardorff (2004).

We intend to explore several additional explanations in the near future. The product cycle model seems a natural candidate. It claims countries trade dominance in export markets based on their development stage, with more developed countries exporting more advanced products first and developing countries replacing them as they adopt technology and take advantage of their low labour costs. According to the quality ladder variant of the model, developed countries may restore their dominance by supplying a higher-quality variety of the product. The product cycle model could be able to explain both the extent of turnover in international trade and the fact that countries may return to the same market they had previously exited.

There are two difficulties the product cycle faces in explaining short duration. One is that most trade economists would expect the product cycle to be much longer than one year, the median observed length of a trade relationship. The other is the observation that, once developing countries enter a market, developed countries do not leave and still experience systematically longer trade relationships. It is possible that, by the time developing countries enter, the market is very competitive and it is difficult to establish a long-term presence. Developed countries may also be able to establish a name for themselves and maintain their longer presence through branding. The period of time we investigate could be too short to observe developed countries abandoning a sufficient number of products to identify the full extent of the product cycle, but it should be possible to identify parts of it.

Another potential explanation we intend to pursue is a model of trade and search costs (Rauch and Watson 2003). The idea is that U.S. firms search for appropriate partners in the world market. Such searching is costly and uncertain. Depending on the quality of the search, U.S. buyers may immediately find good partners with whom they will do business with over long periods of time. Or they could go through several unsuccessful short relationships before they find a good match.27

The issues investigated in this paper are related but separate from the literature on firm heterogeneity as reviewed by Tybout (2003). While we use import data, the majority of the firm heterogeneity literature uses export data. The difference is not innocuous. We observe a country’s exports of a product

27 In Besedeš and Prusa (2005) we examine duration from a search cost perspective.
to a single market, while it observes plant or firm exports to the whole world market. By using U.S. import data, we are focusing not on the question of why firms or countries export, but rather on the length of their exports to a specific market, albeit the largest market in the world.

We observe trade at the country level for a multitude of products, while the literature on firm heterogeneity explores the details of plant- and firm-level data sets. The extent of dynamics of trade uncovered here could be interpreted as a lower bound on the dynamics (and an upper bound on survival) of trade at the plant and firm levels. If the median duration of trade relationships at the country level is between two and four years, it must mean the median duration of trade at the firm level can be, at most, two to four years and is very likely even smaller. Considering that the median duration of trade does not change significantly as data are aggregated, the results are even more surprising in the light of their implications for firm-level dynamics.

Such a conclusion is reached, ignoring the last important difference between our work and the literature on firm heterogeneity: product coverage. Our data are recorded at the product level, while the firm-level data are obviously recorded at the firm or plant level. An exporting firm could be producing and exporting a single product, or several, or even change its product mix over time, while continuing to export. Our data identify exports of a particular product, regardless of which firm(s) produced it and regardless of whether it is the first product exported by the firm or one in a series of new products the firm produces as it benefits from its export experience. Whether such product switching has an impact on the firm’s performance and whether product switching is a consequence of its participation in world markets is beyond the scope of our data. In the light of the aggregation results, we speculate that product switching plays a small role; for if it played a large role, duration would be longer at the industry level.

Several questions related to the issue of product switching are ripe for additional study. What happens when a country stops exporting a particular product? Does it switch to similar products or very different products, or does it stops exporting altogether to the U.S. market? Again, aggregation results suggest there is little switching to similar products. Whether it switches to different products is an important question that merits careful examination. What happens in a product market when a country enters or exits? Does entry occur at the expense of incumbents, or is there an expansion of the market itself? Similarly, does exit lead to a contraction of the market?

Finally, the firm heterogeneity literature draws conclusions about the importance of sunk entry and exit costs. We can do so only cautiously here. Our results suggest that if sunk costs are important in trade, they are important for exporting itself, rather than exporting to a particular market. The median spell length of just a year suggests that sunk costs are recovered immediately as trade starts. But that would imply they are not important, since their recovery does not require prolonged presence in a market. However, this is by no means
a definitive answer on sunk costs in trade. At minimum, we should examine a country’s exports to all markets, rather than a country’s imports from all countries. This is also a matter of our ongoing research.

7. Concluding comments

The findings presented here indicate that countries tend to trade over short intervals of time. We have shown it is a surprisingly robust result. Trade relationships remain short when we change the way relationships are measured and when we control for multiple spells and censoring in different ways. There are a large number of short trade relationships in every industry and with virtually every country the U.S. trades. Trade is of short duration, whether one looks at highly disaggregated product-level data or moderately aggregated industry-level data. Trade relationships become long-lasting only once data are aggregated to the 1-digit SITC level, representing just 10 major industries rather than thousands of products. We do not believe that the single-digit level of aggregation is sufficient to capture all differences between products traded in world markets. Similarly, weighting observed spells of service differently, based on traded value, GDP of the source country, or the source country’s world export share, though increasing duration, does not markedly change the results. The great majority of spells are still rather short: four years or less.

We have provided a novel approach to examine international trade, which provided us with a set of interesting and surprising facts. Trade is very short. The challenge now is to explain why duration of trade is so short. While we have offered several potential explanations, future work must discriminate between them.

References